The Electricity Act (Amendment) 2025 does not directly guarantee constant power supply or prevent grid collapses. It creates a regulatory framework that could enable improvements, but actual results depend entirely on massive infrastructure investment that the law itself doesn’t provide.
The amendment addresses governance, penalties, and subsidies. It doesn’t fix the physical problems causing blackouts: aging transmission lines, insufficient generation capacity, poor maintenance, gas supply shortages to power plants, and vandalism of critical infrastructure.
Grid collapses in Nigeria happen because the transmission network is weak and overloaded. The national grid can barely wheel 5,000 megawatts even though demand exceeds 30,000 megawatts. Decentralising regulation to states doesn’t automatically strengthen transmission infrastructure, which remains a federal responsibility.
State-level regulation might help by encouraging distributed generation and minigrids that reduce pressure on the national grid. If states like Lagos or Rivers develop independent power systems, they become less vulnerable to national grid failures. But building parallel infrastructure takes years and billions of dollars.
The tougher penalties for vandalism could help if consistently enforced. Nigeria loses enormous amounts of power to sabotage of transmission towers and theft of transformers and cables. However, prosecution requires effective policing and courts, which many states lack. Previous laws against vandalism existed but were rarely enforced.
Ghana faced severe power crises from 2012 to 2016, with constant blackouts crippling the economy. The government tackled the problem through several concrete steps that Nigeria’s new law doesn’t replicate. Ghana invested heavily in generation capacity. The government added over 5,000 megawatts of new power plants between 2016 and 2020, including thermal plants, solar farms, and the Karpower floating power plant. Nigeria talks about investment but hasn’t matched Ghana’s actual capital deployment.
Ghana reformed its power purchase agreements to attract private investment with credible payment guarantees. The Electricity Company of Ghana improved revenue collection and reduced commercial losses. Nigeria’s DisCos still struggle with both, and the new law only empowers NERC to force recapitalisation without addressing the underlying payment discipline crisis.
Ghana maintained a single national regulator, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, which provided policy consistency. Nigeria is now creating 37 separate regulatory environments, which could cause confusion and delay rather than accelerate solutions.
Ghana’s government prioritised gas supply infrastructure. The West African Gas Pipeline and domestic gas fields were developed specifically to fuel power plants reliably. Nigeria has abundant gas but chronic pipeline vandalism and poor gas-to-power infrastructure mean plants often sit idle.
Crucially, Ghana treated electricity as a genuine political priority with presidential oversight. President Nana Akufo-Addo made power sector recovery a signature achievement. Implementation happened quickly with clear accountability. Nigeria has passed multiple electricity reforms since 2005, but implementation repeatedly stalls due to bureaucratic inertia and political interference.
Côte d’Ivoire achieved reliable power through aggressive private sector partnerships. The government allowed independent power producers to build modern plants with long-term contracts backed by sovereign guarantees. Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Électricité, though state-linked, operates commercially with minimal political interference.
The country invested in regional interconnections, importing power from Ghana and exporting to neighbors, which created redundancy and revenue. Nigeria’s cross-border trading framework in the new amendment could enable this, but only if states don’t erect barriers and the transmission network gets upgraded.
Senegal improved supply by diversifying its energy mix rapidly. The government added 500 megawatts of solar and wind capacity alongside gas plants within five years. Streamlined permitting and credible power purchase agreements attracted investors quickly. Nigeria’s state-by-state licensing could slow rather than speed this process if regulatory standards aren’t harmonised.
Senegal also subsidised connections for poor households transparently through a dedicated fund, similar to Nigeria’s PCAF. But Senegal’s fund is well-managed and actually delivers, while Nigeria’s track record with special funds suggests high risk of mismanagement or political capture.
The new law doesn’t address gas supply infrastructure, which is critical since gas generates over 70% of Nigeria’s electricity. Without reliable fuel delivery to power plants, generation capacity remains theoretical. It doesn’t mandate or fund transmission upgrades. The Transmission Company of Nigeria has a huge investment backlog, and state-level regulation can’t fix federal transmission bottlenecks that cause grid collapses.
The amendment doesn’t solve the foreign exchange crisis affecting power sector imports. Generating companies and DisCos need dollars for equipment and spare parts, but forex scarcity causes delays. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have more stable currencies and better forex access.
Payment discipline isn’t structurally fixed. DisCos still owe generating companies and gas suppliers billions. The NERC can force recapitalisation, but that doesn’t guarantee DisCos will suddenly pay bills promptly or that consumers will pay DisCos.
The law doesn’t create an emergency infrastructure fund. Ghana mobilised billions through sovereign bonds and development partner loans specifically for power projects. Nigeria’s amendment assumes states and private investors will provide capital, but doesn’t create mechanisms to mobilise it at scale.
State-level regulation could work if states use their authority wisely. A state like Lagos could license embedded generation for industrial estates, approve rooftop solar quickly, and develop local minigrids independent of the national grid. This distributes risk and reduces blackout vulnerability.
The Power Consumer Assistance Fund could improve affordability if properly managed, encouraging more people to connect legally rather than steal power. This increases revenue for infrastructure investment. Stricter penalties for theft and vandalism create deterrence, but only if courts actually jail offenders and police investigate cases. The law provides tools, but political will determines whether they’re used.
Cross-border electricity trading rules could enable Nigeria to import power from neighbors or sell excess capacity regionally, creating efficiency. But this requires transmission infrastructure that doesn’t yet exist.
Nigeria’s new electricity law is necessary but insufficient. It reforms governance without delivering the infrastructure investment, fuel supply reliability, payment discipline, and transmission upgrades that actually prevent blackouts.
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal succeeded because governments made massive capital investments, attracted serious private sector participation with credible guarantees, ensured fuel supply reliability, and maintained focused political leadership. They reformed regulation and implemented simultaneously.
Nigeria has reformed regulation multiple times while implementation lags.
The 2025 amendment could enable progress if states build capacity quickly, the Federal Government invests in transmission, investors receive credible payment assurances, and gas infrastructure improves. Without these, blackouts and grid collapses will continue regardless of regulatory structure.
The law creates opportunities. Whether Nigeria seizes them depends on execution, funding, and political commitment that previous reforms have repeatedly lacked. Constant power supply won’t come from legislation alone. It requires billions of dollars, competent project management, and sustained government focus over many years.
Ade Adesokan is a public affairs commentator and human rights advocate
